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Ili :'HE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DELBERT KRESSER and 
EDWARD KRESSER, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
VAUGHN PETERSON and 
GLADE ARTHUR PETERSON, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
C:>se No. 19285 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF CASE 
This case is an action to set aside, cancel and 
void a Warranty Deed of real property. 
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
The Trial Court ruled that the subject Warranty 
Deed was delivered, supported by good and valuable 
consideration, and was a valid conveyance of title to the 
subject real property. Judgment was granted in favor of 
the Defendants and against the Plaintiffs; that the 
Plaintiffs' Complaint pled no cause of action; and that the 
Defendants were awarded their court costs, including, but 
not limited to, deposition costs and expenses. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellants seek reversal of the Trial Court's 
and entry of a judgment setting aside, cancelling 
and voiding the subject Warranty Deed, based solely upon 
the issue that the Deed was not delivered. The Respondents 
ask the Court to affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The material facts with respect to the issue of 
delivery of the subject Warranty Deed have been stipulated 
to within the Pre-Trial Order governing trial of this 
action. (R. 96-104) The Appellants have correctly set 
forth the stipulated facts, paragraphs one (1) through six 
( 6) , in their Brief. However, they have incorrectly set 
forth the stipulated facts in their paragraphs seven (7) 
through thirty (30). The Respondents hereby restate the 
stipulated facts contained within the Pre-Trial Order. 
(R. 96-104) 
III. The following facts are admitted or are not 
to be contested at trial: 
a. On May 21, 1949, Edward Kresser, Sr. and 
Della Pyper Kresser were married in the State of Nevada. 
b. At said time, Edward Kress er, Sr. was 
already the father of two sons, by a prior marriage with 
Louie Barrett, which sons, Delbert Kresser and Edward 
Fresser, are the Plaintiffs in this action. 
c. At said time, Della Pyper Kress er was 
&ln_o2d·1 the mother of two sons, by a prior marriage with 
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Arthur Peterson, which sons, Lloyd Peterson and Glade 
Peterson, aka Vaughn Peterson and Arthur Peterson, 
respectively, are the Defendants in this action. 
d. Sometime in 1951, Edward Kresser, Sr. and 
Della Pyper Kresser purchased the real property which is 
the subject of this action, as joint tenants, which real 
property is located at 2140 South 1800 East, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, and more particularly known as: 
All of Lots 36 and 37, Bl. 3, Idlewild 
Addition, a subdivision of part of the 
Northeast quarter of Section 21, Township 1 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, in 
the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah, according to the plat thereof 
recorded in the office of the County 
Recorder of said County. 
e. After several transactions between 
themselves, Edward Kress er, Sr. and Della Pyper Kress er 
owned the subject real property as joint tenants with full 
rights of survivorship at the time of the death of Edward 
Kresser, Sr., on April 20, 1970. 
f. Fee simple title to the subject real 
property passed to Della Pyper Kresser, outside the estate 
of Edward Kresser, Sr., by operation of law, upon the death 
of Edward Kresser, Sr. 
g. On June 16, 1970, Della Pyper Kresser 
executed a document entitled "Will of Della Pyper Kresser," 
a copy of which document is attached hereto. 
h. Said Will provides as follows: 
I give, devise, and beaueath the house 
and property at 2140 Scn:ith 18th East in 
- 3 -
Salt Lake County, 
described as follows: 
State of Utah, 
All of Lots 36 and 37, Block 3 Idlewild 
Addition in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, 
to Lloyd Vaughn Peterson, 
Peterson, Edward Kresser, 
Kresser in equal shares. 
Glade Arthur 
and Delbert 
i. On July 2, 1976, Della Pyper Kresser 
executed a hand-written codicil on the bottom of the Will. 
j. Said codicil provides as follows: 
It is my wish that at the time of my 
death, that my son, Lloyd, have first 
opportunity to purchase my home at 2140 
South 18th East. 
k. On April 15, 1977, Della Pyper Kresser 
executed a Warranty Deed, which was also acknowledge, which 
conveyed all of her right, title and interest in the 
subject real property to Della P. Kresser (herself), Lloyd 
V. Peterson (a Defendant herein), and Glade A. Peterson (a 
Defendant herein), as joint tenants with full rights of 
survivorship, a copy of which Warranty Deed is attached 
hereto. 
1. On April 18, 1977, the subject Warranty 
Deed was recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder in Book 4476, at Page 964, as Entry No. 2933125 of 
said records. Said Warranty Deed was recorded by Della 
Pyper Kresser, at her request, and so noted by the Recorder 
a': the top of the Deed. 
m. After the Warranty Deed was recorded, it 
r, .. ?as returned to Della Pyper Kresser, by the Recorder, at 
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her address of 2140 South 1800 East, Salt Lake City, l'tah 
84106. 
n. Della Pyper Kresser died on October 19, 
1981. 
o. Della Pyper Kresser was the exclusive 
occupant of the property until her death. 
p. During all times relevant hereto, Della 
Pyper Kresser was one hundred percent independent as 
to her business and personal affairs. 
q. The Warranty Deed was located in a safe 
deposit box at Continental Bank and Trust Company, several 
days prior to her death by her son, Lloyd Peterson, a 
Defendant herein, which safe deposit box wa.s rented by 
Della Pyper Kress er as "Tenant", Lloyd Peterson, as "Joint 
Tenant", a.nd Glade Peterson as "Joint Tenant", pursuant to 
the Safe Deposit Rental Agreement attached hereto. 
1. Neither Lloyd Peterson nor Glade 
Peterson knew the deed was in the safe deposit box. 
2. Neither Lloyd Peterson nor Glade 
Peterson had ever gone to the box prior to the of 
the deed in the safe deposit box. 
3. Della Pyper Kresser left no 
instructions about the box or contents with Lloyd Peterson 
or Glade Peterson, or anyone else that they were aware of. 
r. Lloyd Peterson did l'Ot have Della ??per 
Kresser's express pennissicn or autrJ)rii::1 tr) t,Jh.:c the> deed 
from the safe deposit box, as '.::O pc:cr:iissioc or 
:wtliorization granted in the language within the Safe 
Deposit Rental Agreement, if any. 
s. Neither Lloyd Peterson nor Glade Peterson 
hcid authorized possession of the key to the safe deposit 
hox at any time except as to any authorization granted in 
the Safe Deposit Rental Agreement, if any. 
t. Neither Glade Peterson nor Lloyd Peterson 
ever saw the Warranty Deed prior to the location of it in 
the safe deposit box. 
u. Neither Lloyd Peterson nor Glade Peterson 
paid the ten dollars ($10) mentioned in the Warranty Deed. 
v. Della Pyper Kress er felt great love and 
dffection for her natural sons, Lloyd Peterson and Glade 
Peterson, the Defendants herein, during all times relevant 
hereto. 
w. At the time Della Pyper Kresser executed 
her Will, she intended that the subject real property 
should be passed through her estate and distributed to 
Lloyd Peterson, Glade Peterson, Delbert Kresser, and Edward 
Kresser, Jr., as her devisees, pursuant to the terms of her 
\,Jill. 
x. At the time Della Pyper Kresser executed 
the subject Warranty Deed, she intended that present title 
to the subject real property be transferred to her natural 
sons, Lloyd Peterson a71d Glade Peterson, the Defendants 
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y. During the life of Della Pyper Kresser, 
she paid all taxes, hazard insurance, and utilities on the 
subject real property. 
z. Shortly prior to the execution of the 
Warranty Deed, during its execution, and shortly 
thereafter, Della Pyper Kresser verbally represented to 
Mayme Peterson (the wife of Defendant Lloyd Peterson), 
Blanche Liebelt (the sister of Della Pyper Kresser), and 
DeNiece Starich (the Notary Public in front of whom the 
Warranty Deed was signed) that she (Della Pyper Kresser) 
desired and intended to transfer present title in the 
subject real property to herself and her natural sons, 
Lloyd Peterson and Glade Peterson, the Defendants herein. 
aa. Shortly prior to the execution of the 
Warranty Deed, during its execution, and thereafter, Della 
Pyper Kresser verbally represented to Mayme Peterson (the 
wife of Defendant Lloyd Peterson), Blanche Liebelt (the 
sister of Della Pyper Kresser), and DeNiece Starich (the 
Notary Public in front of whom the Warranty Deed was 
signed) that she (Della Pyper Kresser) did not desire or 
intend that the subject real property pass to Delbert 
Kresser and Edward Kresser, Jr. 
bb. No undue influence or fraud was 
perpetrated upon Della Pyper Kresser or the Plaintiffs 
herein, by the Defendants at anytioe relevant hereto. 
cc. This action affects title to or an 
interest in real property located within Salt Lake County, 
c.tate of Utah. 
This action was brought by the 
Plaintiffs/Appellants to set aside, cancel or void the 
subject Warranty Deed. If they are successful, the 
property will revert to the estate of Della Pyper Kresser 
and pass in equal shares to both of the Appellants and both 
of the Defendants/Respondents. If they are not successful, 
the property will have previously been conveyed to only the 
Respondents by the Warranty Deed and will have been adeemed 
from the estate. 
ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court was faced with the important 
responsibility of determing whom an elderly lady desired to 
receive her home upon her death. Since, by virtue of her 
death, she was not able to personally oversee that her 
wishes would be fulfilled, she was forced to rely upon 
written declarations of her intent and hope that her 
children would respect these declarations, and, if need be, 
a court of law correctly interpret them. This Court is 
faced with a like responsibility. 
- 8 -
POINT ONE 
DELIVERY OF A DEED IS NECESSARY FOR AN 
EFFECTIVE CONVEYANCE OF AN INTEREST 
IN REAL PROPERTY 
Before a deed is an effective conveyance of an 
interest in real property, it must be delivered. Wiggill 
v. Cheney, 597 P.2d 1351 (Utah 1979); 23 Arn.Jur.2d, Deeds 
§76 (1965). 
POINT TWO 
DELIVERY IS ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH ACTUAL 
DELIVERY OF THE DEED OR CONSTRUCTIVE 
DELIVERY OF THE DEED 
As a legal concept, "Delivery" is a remnant of 
our Anglo-Norman heritage of common law. It has been fully 
embraced by all jurisdictions, and its modern requirements 
are a result of decades of judicial interpretation. As 
stated in 23 Arn.Jur.2d, Deeds §78, p.131: 
While it is impossible to state in exact 
terms what shall or shall not constitute 
a delivery of a deed, as legal term, 
"Delivery" of a deed imports that 
possession, or the to possession, 
of the instrument, w ich is in 
respects complete, has passed from the 
grantor to the grantee with intent to 
pass title as a present transfer. It is 
the final act which consurrnnates the deed, 
silijnifying that it is in operation and 
eftect, and without which the deed would 
be inoperative to pass the title. 
In other words, the deliverv of a deed in 
the law of conveyancing is a transfer of 
it from the grantor to the grantee or his 
agent or to some third person tor che 
gre.ntee 's use, in sucn manner as to 
deprive the graPtor er the right to 
recall it at his o ticn, and with intent 
to convev tit-e. mp e.aaea. 
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Delivery is a matter of intent of the granter. 
Such intent is to be determined from the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the preparation and execution of 
1 tie deed. Losee v. Jones, 120 Utah 385, 235 P. 2d 132 
11951). This determination should look to the relationship 
between the parties, the property involved, the reasons for 
execution, and prior and post-execution statements and 
actions. First Security Bank of Utah v. Burgi, 122 Utah 
445' 251 p. 2d 297 (1952). 
There is a vital distinction between the use of 
the word "delivery" as simply designating the transfer of 
physical custody of a deed, and the use of the term in the 
legal sense. The intention of the granter to lose legal 
dominion and control of the deed is controlling. He must 
do whatever the law requires to place the deed beyond his 
ability to recall it, thus evidencing his manifest intent 
to transfer his title. Formal or ceremonial acts, such as 
impressing a seal or touching a seal already affixed, or 
placing a handful of dirt in the grantee's hand, have long 
been declared legal anachronisms, and replaced by physical 
delivery of the deed (actual delivery) or recordation of 
the deed (constructive delivery). 
The Appellants attempt to persuade this Court 
that the cowman law of Utah recognizes actual delivery of a 
deed as the only method by which a granter could signify 
his intent that it is in full operation and effect. In 
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order to prevail upon appeal, they must convince this Court 
that constructive delivery has no legal effect whatsoever. 
In order to do so, the Appellants cite 23 
Am.Jur.2d, Deeds §89, p.138, for the proposition that 
actual delivery of the deed to the grantee is an absolute 
requirement. Their citation reads as follows: 
A sufficient delivery of a deed requires 
that there be a manifestation of the 
intention of the grantor to relinquish 
all dominion and control over the 
instrument and to have it become 
presently effective as the transfer of 
title. There is no delivery in law where 
the grantor keeps the deed his 
ossession with the of 
retainin it, articu ar 
ossession o t e rooert a 
grantor retains t e to control or 
reclaim a deed, there is no delivery even 
though gr an tor never exercises such 
right. (Emphasis added.) 
Not only do they ignore the qualifying words 
within their own citation that clearly indicate that the 
grantor must retain possession of the deed with the 
intention of retaining it or with the right to it 
before there will be no delivery, they have carefully 
hand-picked portions of the full citation, deleting any 
reference to constructive delivery, especially by recording 
of the deed by the grantor. The full tex:: of Section 89 
reads as follows: 
While delivery may be by words or acts, 
or by both combined, and while it is not 
essential to legal del::.verv of the deed 
that physical of the 
instrument be trans:erred :rom zrantor co 
rantee, it is essertial to 
e iverv ot a ee t.at c e grantor ose 
dominion and control over the instrument. 
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A sufficient delivery of a deed reluires 
that there be a manifestation o the 
intention of the granter to relinquish 
all dominion and control over the 
instrument and to have it become 
resentlv effective as a transfer of 
tit e. ere is no e ivery in aw w ere 
keeps the deed in his own 
possession with the intention of 
retaining it, particularly if he keeps 
possession of the property as well. If a 
granter retains the right to control or 
reclaim a deed, there is no delivery even 
though the granter never exercises such 
right. Where the proof fails to show 
that the granter did any act by which he 
parted with the possession of the deed 
for the benefit of the grantee, the 
question of intent becomes immaterial. 
In other words, delivery may be effected 
b an act manifestin an une uivocal 
intention to surren er t e instrument so 
as to de rive the of all 
aut ority over it or o t e rig t o 
recalling it; but if he does not evidence 
an intention to part presently and 
unconditionally with the deed, there is 
no delivery. 
Alart from proof of delivery by a 
o a chan e of h sical custod , a dee 
is constructive y e ivere w en t e 
granter has parted with the ri*'ht to 
retain it. In all cases where aeed is 
found in the ran tor's ossession, the 
question is, i t e granter ave t e 
right to retain the deed as against the 
grantee? The mere fact that his 
continued ossession ives him the 
p ysical opportunity to estroy t e ee 
is immaterial because he has not the 
right to do so; and if he should destroy 
it, the deed would nevertheless be 
operative by reason of the prior 
constructive delivery. On the other 
hand the dominion over the instrument 
must' pass from the granter with the 
intent that it will pass to the grantee, 
if the latter will accept it; and if the 
deed remains within the grantor's control 
and liable to be recalled, there is no 
de 1 i very, no twi ths tanding he has parted 
1vith its immediate possession. Hence, it 
is held that no effectual delivery is 
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made where the grantor's instructions, on 
a fair construction, show that he does 
not contemplate absolute release of 
control. Nor is an effective delivery 
made where the granter and grantee place 
mutual deeds in a box to which they have 
equal opportunity of access and where the 
gr an tor exercises control of the 
contents. In the case of a deed executed 
by joint granters, the continued custody 
and control of the instrument by one 
granter will preclude the instrument from 
taking effect as a conveyance. 
While these legal principles are clear, 
each case presents distinctive facts upon 
which they must operate, so that it is 
often difficult to determine whether the 
particular facts establish such a 
transfer of a deed to constitute a legal 
delivery of it and make it operative as a 
conveyance. No precise formula of acts 
or words is necessary to effect delivery, 
and there is no universal test, 
applicable to all cases, whereby the 
sufficiency of delivery can be 
determined. It can be stated 9enerall_y_,_ 
however, that there is a sufficient le2aI 
e ivery w ere t e granter t is acts or 
words, or both, manifestsis intention 
to relinquish all dominion and control 
over the and to have it become 
presentl1 effective as a transfer of 
title. Emphasis added.) 
POINT THREE 
THE SUBJECT WARRANTY DEED WAS CONSTRUCTIVELY 
DELIVERED BY DELLA PYPER KRESSER, AS GRANTOR, 
TO THE RESPONDENTS, AS GRANTEES 
As the stipulated facts indicate, Della Pyper 
Kresser owned fee simple title in the subject real 
property. On April 15, 1977, she executed a Warranty Deed, 
which was also acknowledged, which conveyed all of her 
right, title and interest in the subj€ct re3l property to 
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Della P. Kress er 
Defendant/Respondent 
(herself), Lloyd V. Peterson 
herein), and Glade A. Peterson 
(a 
(a 
Defendant/Respondent herein), as joint tenants with full 
rights of survivorship. On April 18, 1977, the Deed was 
recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder, in 
Book 4476, at Page 964, as Entry No. 2933125 in said 
records, by and at the request of Della Pyper Kresser, as 
noted at the top of the Deed by the Recorder. After 
recording, it was returned to Mrs. Kresser at her residence 
by the Recorder. It remained in her possession until 
shortly prior to her death. (R.99, 143) 
At the time she executed and recorded the Deed, 
she intended that present title to her home be transferred 
to herself and the Respondents herein as joint tenants. 
This intent was specifically stipulated. She manifested her 
intent by verbally instructing the wife of one of the 
Respondents, her sister and confidant, and the Notary 
Public in front of whom the Deed was signed, that she 
desired and intended to transfer present title in her home 
to and the Respondents, and that she did not desire 
or intend that her home pass to the Appellants pursuant to 
her Will. (R.101, 145) 
These uncontroverted and stipulated facts clearly 
constitute constructive delivery of the subject Warranty 
Deed. 
delivery. 
Recordation of a deed is prima facia evidence of 
Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker, 122 Utah 268, 248 
- 14 -
P.2d 692 (1952). In cases \Jhere the deed is returned to 
the granter after recordation, the mere fact of its 
possession by the grantor is immaterial, for he has 
extinguished his right to destroy it or recall it. Under 
the law it is effective and he is bound by its terms. 23 
Am.Jur.2d, Deeds §89, p.139. 
A party opposing a deed must prove its invalidity 
by the clearest and most convincing of evidence. 
Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 17 Utah 2d 420, 413 
P.2d 807 (1966); Northcrest v. Walker Bank and Trust Co., 
supra. In addition, where a deed has been recorded, the 
only way delivery can be defeated is to show an absolute 
lack of intent by the grantor to transfer his title. Since 
recordation and lack of intent to transfer title are 
diametrically opposed, for a gr an tor normally would not 
record a deed if he did not intend on it taking effect, the 
Courts place the highest burden of proof upon the party 
challenging the deed to show no intent. Gold Oil Land 
Development Corp. v. Davis, 611 P.2d 711 (Utah 1980); 
Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, supra; Allen v. 
Allen, 115 Utah 303, 204 P.2d 458 (1949); Chamberlin v. 
Larsen, 83 Utah 420, 29 P.2d 355 (1934). 
This presumption is so strong, the Utah Supreme 
Court has upheld delivery in every case where the deed was 
recorded by the grantor, regardless of whether physical 
possession of the deed was thereafter retained by the 
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gr an tor or relinquished to the grantee. Controlled 
Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, supra; Allen v. Allen, supra. 
In the Allen case, supra, the grantor quit-
claimed her house to her two children, but retained a life 
estate. She recorded the deed, but had the recorder return 
it to her, where she kept it in her possession until her 
death. There was never a manual delivery of the deed. The 
court found that the facts did not rebut the presumption of 
delivery, especially by the clearest and most convincing of 
evidence. Since they are similar to the facts in the case 
at bar, a review of the court's reasoning sheds light upon 
the importance that is placed on recordation versus the 
return of the deed by the Recorder to the grantor after 
recordation. It reasoned: 
In the present case, then, we have two 
acts indicative of an intention to make 
an immediate conveyance--the rentention 
of the life estate and the recording. 
What then of the retention of the deed 
after recording? As the grantor had 
reserved a life estate in herself, there 
is some reasonable explanation for her 
desire to retain it as evidencing her 
interest. Furthermore, since the 
conve ance was to two ersons it appears 
that s e wou esire to have 
of the deed herself. Thus, 
of the deed to her after 
- 16 -
later dis osal, unless thev reallv intend 
to trans er some interest to t e person 
whose name is thus placed in the record. 
(Emphasis adaed.) 
Allen v. Allen, supra, 204 P.2d at 460-461. 
In the Controlled Receivables case, supra, the 
granter transferred his title to a strawman who then 
transferred it to the grantor's four children and the 
granter, as joint tenants. The deeds were then recorded by 
the strawman and returned to the grant or, who retained 
their possession for fifteen years without objection. Some 
years later, the gr an tor challenged the deeds for 
nondelivery. Since the operative facts are similar to the 
case at bar, the court's respect for recordation and the 
subsequent return of the deeds to the granter, who also was 
a cograntee (as in the case at bar), is worth reviewing. 
The court reasoned: 
With respect to the fact that Claude 
[granter] retained possession of the 
deeds, it is of little or no significance 
in rebutting the presumption of delivery 
in this case. A delivery to one cotenant 
is generally regarded as a deliver{ to 
all. This rule is particu arly 
applicable in the instant case, for at 
the time of the execution of the 
conveyance Claude's children were all 
minors. It is only natural that he, as 
parent and guardian, should be the 
custodian of the deeds. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 413 P.2d at 
809. 
:i:n the Allen and Cont-col led Receivables cases, 
supra, the court looked to the actions of the granter to 
- :7 -
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determine her intent. If they evidenced a desire to 
transfer present title in the real property, then 
constructive delivery was upheld, regardless of whether 
actual, physical delivery occurred. In Allen, the court 
considered two acts as indicative of the grantor's 
intention to immediately convey title; i.e. the retention 
of a life estate and recording. In the case at bar, Mrs. 
Kresser also retained an interest in her home, a joint 
tenancy interest, and she recorded the Deed. Further, Mrs. 
Kress er was only one of three grantees. As in the Allen 
case, she solved the problem of which grantee should retain 
the Deed by choosing herself. As the court indicated in 
Allen, this choice was logical and did not militate against 
delivery. 
In Controlled Receivables, the court relied 
heavily upon the gr an tor's act of recording, and placed 
little significance in the fact that he retained possession 
of the deed after recording, especially in light of the 
fact that the gr an tor was also a cograntee. The court 
ruled that delivery to one grantee was delivery to all 
grantees. In the case at bar, Mrs. Kresser was a 
cograntee. 
The Controlled Receivables case, supra, further 
demonstrates the weight given to recording as indicative of 
grantor's intention and as constructive delivery. In 
case, the deed and its delivery were being attacked by 
its granter, not by third parties to the transaction (as in 
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the case at bar). Even in these circumstances, delivery 
was upheld and the grantor was not allowed to change his 
mind and retake title to the property several years down 
the road. The court should be even less willing to allow 
third parties to the deed attack its validity and delivery, 
as in the case at bar. This is especially so where the 
parties expressly stipulated that the deed represented the 
grantor's intentions and where she made contemporaneous 
statements to several people that the deed was consistent 
with her desire, and she is now deceased and unable to 
protect her wishes. 
In only three cases, the Utah Supreme Court has 
ruled no delivery where the deed was recorded. First 
Security Bank of Utah v. Burgi, supra, 251 P.2d 297; Gold 
Oil Land Development Corp. v. Davis, supra, 611 P.2d 711; 
and Norling v. Anderson, 535 P.2d 1252 (Utah 1975). In the 
first, the deed was recorded by the grantee, not the 
granter, after the grantor's death. In the second, a blank 
deed was filled out by the grantee and recorded by him, 
without the knowledge and authorization of the grantor. In 
the third, the deed was removed from the grantor's safety 
deposit box when she was sick and incapacitated and 
recorded by a grantee. 
Again, in every case where the grantor has 
recorded the deed, the court has upheld 
delivery, based upon the reasoning that:"[p]eople as a rule 
do not deliberately put a flaw in the title to their 
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property, thereby handicapping its later disposal, unless 
thev really intend to transfer some interest to the person 
"1lwse name is thus placed in the record." Allen v. Allen, 
_"upra, 204 P. 2d at 461. 
The Appellants cite two cases of nonrecording EY 
the granters as being dispositive of the case at bar: 
Wiggill v. Cheney, supra, 597 P.2d 1351; and Norling v. 
Anderson, supra, 535 P.2d 1252. 
In the Wiggill case, the granter signed a deed 
and placed it in a safety deposit box which was in her sole 
and complete control. She left instructions that only upon 
her death was the box to be opened. The court correctly 
held that there was no delivery of the deed. It ruled 
that: "in order for a delivery effectively to transfer 
title, the granter must part with possession of the deed or 
the right to retain it." (Emphasis added.) Wiggill, 597 
P.2d at 1352. 
In the Norling case, the deed was prepared and 
signed by the grantee who placed it in her safety deposit 
box where it remained until it was removed and recorded by 
a grantee while the granter was seriously ill and mentally 
incompetent. Again, the court correctly held that there 
-·2s :10 delivery of the deed. 
Unlike the case at bar, there was no evidence of 
intent to transfer present title. There was no recording 
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by and at the request of the grantor. In both cases, the 
grantee recorded the deed after the grantor's death or 
incapacity. There were no declarations of the gr an tors' 
desire to transfer immediate title to the grantees. There 
was no act by the granters that would terminate their right 
to retain possession of the deeds and right to recall their 
transfer of title. 
The Appellants go to great length arguing that, 
in the case at bar, Mrs. Kresser, the grantor, placed the 
deed in her safety deposit box after it was recorded. They 
completely fail to understand or purposely fail to reveal 
to the court that the operative facts of delivery occurred 
long before Mrs. Kress er placed the deed in her safety 
deposit box. 
Again, delivery occurred upon her rrtanifesta tion 
of intent to convey present title. Such intent was 
stipulated. She declared her intent to several individuals 
shortly before, during and after the Deed's execution and 
recordation. Finally, she consummated its delivery by 
performing the one act, willingly and knowingly, that would 
terminate her right to retain the Deed and her prior 
interest in the property. She recorded it. 
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POINT FOUR 
THE BURDEN OF GOING FORWARD WITH THE EVIDENCE 
AND OF PERSUASION WAS UPON THE APPELLANTS 
WHICH BURDEN WAS NOT MET ' 
Recordation of a deed is prima facia evidence of 
delivery. 23 Am.Jr.2d, Deeds §89, p.139, supra. In fact, 
if a deed has been acknowledged and recorded, a presumption 
arises that delivery has occurred. This presumption is 
entitled to "great" and "controlling" weight, and must be 
rebutted by the party asserting nondelivery by the clearest 
and most convincing evidence. Controlled Receivables, 
Inc., supra, 413 P.2d 807; Gold Oil Development Corp., 
supra, 611 P.2d 711; and Allen, supra, 204 P.2d 458. 
In addition to rebutting the presumption of 
delivery, the Appellants had the burden of persuading the 
Trial Court that the deed was invalid because of 
nondelivery, which burden could also have been met by only 
clear and convincing evidence. Northcrest, supra, 248 P.2d 
692; and Controlled Receivables, Inc., supra. 
The Appellants cite the Allen case supra, and 
Chamberlain v. Larsen, 83 Utah 420, 29 P.2d 355 (1934), for 
the proposition that something more than recording is 
necessary to prove delivery. They go to great lengths 
arguing that this something more does not exist in the case 
at bar. 
The Appellants further cite Singleton v. Kelly, 
bl Utah 244, 212 P.63 (1922) for the proposition that the 
intention of the granter is not relevant when there is no 
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evidence of actual delivery. This is not the law. This 
court has recognized that delivery may be accomplished 
constructively. See Allen v. Allen, supra. 
Furthermore, while the grantor's intention is not 
conclusive on the question of delivery, intent is the 
controlling factor where constructive delivery is involved. 
First Security Bank of Utah v. Burgi, supra, 251 P.2d 297; 
Losee v. Jones, supra, 235 P.2d 132. Singleton, however, 
does not apply to the case at bar. Mrs. Kresser, as the 
grantor, co=itted numerous acts that indicate delivery. 
As the above cited treatise and cases indicate, her actions 
were the most relevant and competent evidence possible on 
the issue of delivery. 
The Appellants next argue that Mrs. Kresser's 
will, executed seven years prior to the Warranty Deed, and 
her codicil, executed approximately nine months prior to 
the Warranty Deed, are evidence of her intent to not 
deliver the Warranty Deed. Fortunately, a decedent has the 
opportunity to change her mind about the disposition of her 
property up to the very second of her death. During the 
seven years between her Will and the subject Warranty Deed, 
and the nine months between her codicil and the Deed, Mrs. 
Kresser obviously changed her mind about the disposition of 
her home. She hinted of this change in her codicil, and 
conclusively declared her change of desire at time the 
Deed was executed and recorded (R. 98-C9, l.'i2-l.'i3). More 
importantly, the parties have that she intended 
- -
to transfer her home to the Respondents by way of the Deed, 
thus disinheriting the Apellants. There is no room left 
f,ir the Appellants belated argument that she intended 
,,therwise. 
Their arguments clearly show that they do not 
understand the concept of ademption of property from a 
decedent's estate and the concept of delivery. Again, 
delivery is the intent to transfer present title and the 
manifestation thereof. First Security Bank of Utah v. 
Burgi, supra, 251 P.2d 297; Losee v. Jones, supra, 235 P.2d 
132; 23 Am.Jur 2d, Deeds §89 (1965). 
It is established by facts, actions and 
statements, usually of the granter, that show this intent. 
One action has been identified by the courts as especially 
indicative of this intent, recording, and worthy of special 
significance. As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Allen v. 
Allen, supra, 204 P.2d 458: 
The recording of the deed and placing the 
names of others on the property is 
somewhat in the nature of a public 
declaration that she intended the 
instrument to become effective 
immediately. People as a rule do not 
deliberatly put a flaw in the title to 
their property, thereby handicapping its 
later disposal, unless they really intend 
to transfer some interest to the person 
whose name is thus placed in the record. 
Id. at 461. See also LeMehaute v. LeMehaute, 585 S.W.2d 
(Mo.App. 1979); Corbei::t v. Corbett, 249 N.E. 585, 107 
S.E.2d 165 (1959). 
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In the case at bar, the burden of proving 
delivery, hence the validitv of the deed is nr>t upon the 
Respondents. It rests upon the party the 
invalidity of the deed, the Appellants herein, both as to 
rebutting the presumption and going forward with the 
evidence, and as to persuasion. Chamberlin v. Larsen, 
supra, 29 P.2d 355; Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 
supra, 413 P.2d 807; Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker, supra, 248 
P.2d 692. 
Neither the Trial Court nor the Supreme Court 
need weigh any conflicting evidence of delivery, i.e. the 
grantor's intent to convey present title and manifestation 
thereof. The parties have stipulated that at the time she 
executed the Warranty Deed, she intended to transfer 
present title to herself and the Resi:ondents as joint 
tenants. She manifested this intent by declaring to the 
wife of one of the Respondents, her sister, and the Notary 
Public in front of whom the Deed was signed, that she (the 
grantor) desired and intended to transfer, by the Deed, the 
real property to herself and the Respondents as joint 
tenants, and desired and intended to not have the ?roperty 
pass to the Appellants under r.er earlier Will. Finally, 
three days later she committed the ultimate act 
her intent, she took the Deed to the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's office and recorded 
Delivery was coTCplete at this ;:;ci;ct. 
that the Deed was returned to he:- b'-' the !\ecord"' 2nd 
') c 
subsequently stored in her safety deposit box until shortly 
before her death is meaningless. To assert that this 
,•stablishes nondelivery is nothing more than a desperate 
dLtempt to defeat her wishes by playing games with legal 
anachronisms that have long since disappeared into 
antiquity. Actual, physical, manual delivery of a deed is 
no more required for effective "delivery" than depositing a 
handful of turf or twig of the land in the hand of the 
feofee in the name of seisin of the land. Constructive 
delivery in the manner chosen by Mrs. Kresser, the grantor 
herein, has long since been accepted by the law as 
effective delivery. 
The Trial Court had all of the evidence before it 
and knew the law of delivery. It refused to be caught up 
in the Appellants' argument that actual delivery was the 
only method of effective delivery. It found that Mrs. 
Kresser fully intended to transfer present title by the 
Deed and absolutely manifested this intent, notwithstanding 
the fact that it was returned to her after recording. 
(R.125, 144) The Appellants simply failed in their burden 
of persuu.sion by failing to convince the Trial Court by 
:lear and convincing evidence that recordation coupled with 
Mrs. Kresser's intent and manifestations thereof were 
inconsistent with delivery. 
On rev;..ew, this Court is obliged to view the 
cvider:ce and all inferences that may be drawn therefrom in 
a light r.ost supportive of the findings of the trier of 
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fact. The findings and judfrnent of the Trial Court should 
not be disturbed when they are based upon substantial, 
competent and adrnissable evidence. Nypetco Associates v. 
Jenkins, No. 17564 (Utah, September 14, 1983). If there 
is conflicting evidence, the findings of the Trial Court 
will not be upset on appeal except upon a showing that the 
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
verdict, so clearly preponderate in the Appellants' favor 
that reasonable persons could not differ on the outcome. 
Gillespie v. Southern Utah State College, No. 17850 (Utah, 
August 25, 1983). 
Given the great weight of evidence that 
establishes constructive delivery of the Deed, no reason 
exists for this Court to overturn the Trial Court's 
findings. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Defendants respectfully 
request this Court to affirn the judgment of the trial 
court. 
DATED this ['Jr) day of October, 1983. 
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